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 13 
Abstract 14 
For design-build (DB) projects, owners normally use lump sum and Guaranteed Maximum Price 15 
(GMP) as the major contract payment provisions. However, there was a lack of empirical studies to 16 
compare the project performance within different contract types and investigate how different project 17 
characteristics affect the owners’ selection of contract arrangement. Project information from Design-18 
build Institute of America (DBIA) database was collected to reveal the statistical relationship between 19 
different project characteristics and contract types and to compare project performance between lump 20 
sum and GMP contract. The results show that lump sum is still the most frequently used contract 21 
method for DB projects, especially in the public sector. However, projects using GMP contract are 22 
more likely to have less schedule delay and cost overrun as compared to those with lump sum contract. 23 
The chi-square tests of cross tabulations reveal that project type, owner type, and procurement method 24 
affect the selection of contract types significantly. Civil infrastructure rather than industrial 25 
engineering project tends to use lump sum more frequently; and qualification-oriented contractor 26 
selection process resorts to GMP more often compared with cost-oriented process. The findings of 27 
this research contribute to the current body of knowledge concerning the effect of associated project 28 
characteristics on contract type selection. Overall, the results of this study provide empirical evidence 29 
from real DB projects that can be used by owners to select appropriate contract types and eventually 30 
improve future project performance. 31 
Key words: design-build, contract type, lump sum, GMP, cost plus fee 32 
  33 
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Introduction  34 
Project delivery system is the process by which designers, constructors, and various consultants 35 
provide services for design and construction to deliver a complete project to the owner (Molenaar et al. 36 
2010). In order to meet different sets of construction circumstances, a variety of delivery systems have 37 
been developed including traditional design-bid-build, design-build, construction management, 38 
integrated project delivery, and Contractor Early Involvement, etc. Different delivery systems define 39 
the sequence of events, contractual obligations, participant relationships, and specific mechanisms for 40 
overseeing project performance (Dorsey 1997). Design-build (DB) is a project delivery method where 41 
design and construction services are delivered by one single contractor. The advantages of DB such as 42 
shortened project duration and early certainty of project cost have been proved both theoretically and 43 
empirically in recent years, leading to the increasing popularity of DB in the international construction 44 
market (Konchar and Sanvido, 1998; Xia and Chan, 2008; Hale et al., 2009).  45 
The contract types used in DB projects determine the method of award for contractor selection. 46 
According to Bogus et al. (2010) lump sum and cost-plus-fee with a guaranteed maximum price 47 
(GMP) are the most common ones for DB projects. In a lump sum contract, the DB contractor is 48 
required to complete the project for a fixed price and take the risk of cost overrun. This type of 49 
contract is more appropriate when the scope the project is clearly defined (American Council of 50 
Engineering Companies, 2005; Kaplanogu and Arditi, 2009). The main reason for the adoption of 51 
GMP contracts is to provide the owner with the benefit of an overall cap on project cost when the 52 
project scope cannot be sufficiently defined. In DB practice, a GMP contract is usually negotiated 53 
based on conceptual planning documents when more detailed plans and specifications used for 54 
traditional competitive bidding are not available (Xia et al., 2012a). Additionally, scope changes 55 
should be avoided as much as possible so as to enable owners to have an early price guarantee (Beard 56 
et al. 2001). 57 
The selection of contract types in DB projects is a complex question as both lump sum and GMP have 58 
various advantages and disadvantages. DB projects using GMP contracts are more likely to have 59 
better schedule and cost performance as compared to projects with lump sum provisions (Bogus et al., 60 
2010), however, it is challenging for owners to set the price cap with very preliminary programmatic 61 
requirements. Lump sum contract will enable owner to obtain the cost competitiveness, but may 62 
restrain the innovative input from contractors as owners need to provide more design information for 63 
cost determination, which also leads to longer project duration. Furthermore, a variety of factors may 64 
affect the selection of contract types and should be taken into consideration during the decision 65 
making. For example, private DB owners often use GMP while public owners prefer lump sum 66 
contract (Molenaar et al. 1999); Different procurement methods (e.g. low bid or best value) may also 67 
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require different contract types so as to facilitate contractor evaluation.  As a result, selecting 68 
appropriate contract types for DB project is not deemed as an easy task.  69 
This study aims to examine how different DB project characteristics affect the selection of contract 70 
types (mainly the lump sum and GMP). It is hypothesised that projects with different types, owner 71 
types, procurement methods, project size, and sustainability requirement levels will choose different 72 
contract types respectively. Additionally, this study will compare project performance between lump 73 
sum and GMP contract, and investigate whether there is an interaction between project characteristics 74 
and contract types concerning project cost and time performance (i.e. whether different project 75 
characteristics will lead to different time and cost performance between lump sum and GMP contract).  76 
The overall purpose is to help owners make better decisions in selecting an appropriate contract type 77 
for a specific project. 78 
Research Methods and Data Description 79 
Data accessibility is the foundation of conducting current research. Secondary data analysis was 80 
conducted, using the data previously collected and tabulated by Design-build Institute of America 81 
(DBIA), which is available on http://www.weembo.com/DBIA/Projects. The DBIA was established in 82 
1993 to facilitate DB implementation in the U.S. construction market. By the date of data collection, 83 
there were 418 U.S. DB projects in the DBIA database. These projects, collected from early June 84 
2014 to end of July 2014,  cover all the U.S. states except Maine, Arkansas, and West Virginia) with a 85 
total cost of USD$32 billion (average USD$79 million per project). 86 
The original data information for each project includes project title, location, brief project description, 87 
project team, project overview (covering contracted construction start date, actual construction start 88 
date, contracted construction completion date, actual completion date, contracted total project cost, 89 
actual total project cost, project size, procurement/selection criteria, contract terms, and evaluation 90 
criteria), and additional information including Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design (LEED) 91 
certifications, awards, lesson learned and innovation/creativity. These data are suitable for exploring 92 
the relationship between different project characteristics and contract types. 93 
Fig 1 shows the distribution of contract methods used in DB projects. Obviously, lump sum and GMP 94 
are the dominant contract types for DB, accounting for more than 80% of the total contracts 95 
arrangement. The other main contract method is cost-plus-fee, where design-builders are paid based 96 
on their actual costs (subcontractor costs, labour, materials, etc.) plus a fee, which can be a fixed 97 
amount or a percentage of final cost, to cover overhead and profit. Since owners take the risk of cost 98 
overruns in cost-plus-fee contract, it is rarely used in DB projects. Given the small number of cost 99 
plus fee contract in the database, major statistical analyses were conducted excluding the sample of 100 
this contract.  101 
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Please insert Fig <1> here 102 
The project characteristics in the DBIA database that are believed to influence the selection of 103 
contract types include project type, owner type, project size, procurement method, and sustainability 104 
levels. Figure2 shows the summary of project types. The commercial and institutional buildings are 105 
the dominant project types, followed by civil infrastructure projects and industrial process facilities.  106 
Please insert Fig <2> here  107 
The distribution of project owner types is shown in Figure3. The public owners account for 62.2% of 108 
the total owners agencies, which include federal government (24.5%), state government (14.6%), and 109 
local government/municipal (23.0%). As the Design-Build Institute of America was originally 110 
established to influence federal and state licensing laws to facilitate design/build (Molenaar et al., 111 
1999), it is understandable that the public DB projects dominate the DBIA database.  112 
Please insert Fig <3> here  113 
Using $36.5 million as the size standard for small business according to the North American Industry 114 
Classification System Codes (2012), DB projects can be classified as small or large ones based on the 115 
contracted total project cost. As displayed in Fig 4, the numbers of small and large DB projects are 116 
quite similar.  117 
Please insert Fig <4> here  118 
The procurement method is the purchasing process to gain the services (e.g. design and construction) 119 
and commodities (e.g. materials, equipment) under the project delivery system (Beard et al., 2001; 120 
Molenaar et al., 2010). The four primary procurement methods for DB projects are low-bid, best-121 
value (including fixed budget/best design, best value with discussion and best value without 122 
discussion), qualifications-based, and sole-source procurement (Beard et al., 2001; El Wardani et al, 123 
2006).  In the low bid selection, cost is the primary consideration and cost criteria represent more than 124 
90% of the DB contractor selection process (EI Wardani et al. 2006). In the best value selection, the 125 
prospective DB contractors are primarily evaluated based on the technical aspects together with the 126 
associated cost of the project (Beard et al. 2001). For the qualifications-based selection, the owner 127 
selects DB contractors through a request for qualification and often negotiates a DB contract directly 128 
with the most qualified team to a reasonable price; while in the sole source selection, DB contractors 129 
are directly selected based on selection factors such as past performance, technical qualifications, and 130 
established relationships with owners (Beard et al. 2001).  131 
As shown in Fig 5, best value (63.4%) is the most widely used procurement method for DB projects, 132 
followed by qualification based (24.4%) and sole source (4.8%). Apparently, low bid method is 133 
deemed inappropriate for DB projects as owners need to provide detailed design information in 134 
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request for proposals (RFPs) and this will prevent innovative input from design-builders (Molenaar 135 
and Gransberg 2001; Xia et al., 2012b, 2013) . 136 
Please insert Fig <5> here  137 
Of all the DB projects in the research scope, 38.8% achieved Leadership in Energy and 138 
Environmental Design (LEED) certifications. Developed by the U.S. Green Building 139 
Council (USGBC), LEED is a green building certification program that recognizes best-in-class 140 
building strategies and practices (USGBC, 2015). Nowadays, the idea of sustainable development has 141 
been embraced proactively and there is an increasing number DB owners communicate their desired 142 
level of sustainability through LEED certification system (Xia et al. 2013). As shown in Fig 6, LEED 143 
Silver and LEED Gold are more frequently required to meet the sustainability requirements of project 144 
owners.   145 
Please insert Fig <6> here  146 
 147 
Results and Analysis 148 
Two-way Contingency Table Analysis  149 
Based on the nature of data, the chi-square test of cross tabulations (contingency tables) was used to 150 
evaluate whether there are statistical relationships between project characteristics and contract types.   151 
According to the result in Table 1, the null hypothesis that the contract type is independent of project 152 
type is rejected (p=0.003<0.05), meaning that there is a significant relationship between project type 153 
and contract methods used. Obviously, civil infrastructure projects are more likely to use lump sum 154 
contract while industrial processing projects use GMP. This is because the design/engineering process 155 
in industrial processing projects is more complicated and it will be very challenging for contractor to 156 
propose a lump sum price at early project stage.  157 
Please insert Table <1> here 158 
Table 2 shows the chi-square test result between contract method and owner type. Given that the 159 
significance levelp=.000 <0.05, it can be concluded that project owner types affect the selection of 160 
contract methods significantly. In the private sector, project owners often use GMP contracts, while 161 
public-sector policy generally requires a lump sum contract with contractors. This finding confirms 162 
with Molenaar et al.’s(1999) observation decades ago. This is understandable as public owners are 163 
more incentivised to reduce the cost-overrun risk, and lump sum contract provide them with best 164 
protection relative to the price (Kaplanogu and Arditi, 2009). 165 
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Please insert Table <2> here 166 
 167 
The results in Table 3 reveal that the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant 168 
relationship between procurement type and contract method selection has been rejected as 169 
p=0.000<0.05, which means that the selection of procurement systems will significant affect the 170 
contract types used in DB projects. Additionally, it is clear to see that when the procurement systems 171 
move from low bid to sole source contractor selection, owners tend to shift from lump sum contact to 172 
GMP. This is because, first, lump sum can enable DB owners to obtain the cost competitiveness in 173 
contractor selection. Additionally, when the procurement systems move from low bid to sole source, 174 
less project information is available for contractor selection, therefore, GMP is more frequently used 175 
by owners to reduce the risk of cost overrun and start the project as early as possible. 176 
 177 
Please insert Table <3> here 178 
For the chi-square test of cross tabulations, it is suggested to have no more than 20% of the expected 179 
counts less than 5 and all individual expected counts are 1 or greater (Yates et al., 2007). Given that 180 
41.7% cells have expected count less than 5, the projects with low bid and cost plus fee types were 181 
removed from the sample base, and chi-square test between the remaining procurement types (i.e. best 182 
value, qualification based, and sole source) and contract methods (i.e. Lump sum and GMP) was 183 
conducted.  It is found that same conclusions exist for the remaining database as p=0.000<0.05 (d.f. 184 
=2, 2 =33.267). 185 
For project sizes (small or large) and sustainability levels (in terms of LEED certification levels), the chi-186 
square tests (see Table 4, 5) reveals that these project characteristics have no statistically significant 187 
influence on contract types as both p=.212 and p=.000 >0.05. Despite the lack of significant 188 
relationship, it is interesting to find that larger DB projects tend to use lump sum more frequently than 189 
small ones. Similarly, DB projects with higher LEED levels use lump more frequently compared with 190 
those with lower LEED levels. According to Xia et al. (2012a), owners of larger projects tends to 191 
provide more design information in request for proposals, which facilitate the adoption of lump sum 192 
contract for cost security and competiveness. The underlying reasons for the more frequent use of 193 
lump sum contract for higher LEEDs level projects need to be further investigated.  194 
Please insert Table <4> here 195 
Please insert Table <5> here 196 
 197 
 198 
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Analysis of Variance  199 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the time and cost overrun performance of DB projects with different 200 
contract types. Performance of time overrun and cost performance was calculated as follows: 201 
Time overrun = (Actual total project duration – Contracted total project duration)/Contracted total 202 
project duration 203 
Cost overrun = (Actual total project cost – Contracted total project cost)/Contracted total project cost 204 
As shown in Table 6, DB projects with GMP contract have better time performance (2.15% time 205 
saving) than those with lump sum (0.23% time overrun) and cost plus fee (8.11% of time overrun). 206 
Given the small number of cost plus fee projects, the variance of performance was only analysed 207 
between lump sum and GMP projects. According to the one-way analysis of variance (one-way 208 
ANOVA) tests, there is no statistically significant difference of time performance between projects 209 
with lump and with GMP contracts as p=.270>0.05 (p=.132>0.05 if cost plus fee projects are 210 
included).  211 
Please insert Table <6> here 212 
Table 7 shows that DB project with GMP contracts have better cost performance (3.07% cost 213 
overruns) than those with lump sum (8.70% cost overruns) and cost plus fee (20.06% cost overruns). 214 
Additionally, the one-way ANOVA indicates that projects with GMP contracts have statistically 215 
significant better performance than those with lump sum as p=.023<0.05 (p=0.009<0.05 if cost plus 216 
fee projects are included). 217 
 218 
Please insert Table <7> here 219 
In order to investigate whether other project characteristics have interaction effects on contract types 220 
relating to the cost and time overrun performance, two-way analysis of variance (two-way ANOVA) 221 
was conducted. The two-way ANOVA analysis is an extension of the one-way ANOVA that 222 
examines the influence of two different categorical independent variables on 223 
one continuous dependent variable. It not only helps address the main effect of each independent 224 
variable but also whether there is any interaction between them. 225 
Based on the results of the two-way ANOVA tests (see Table 8), the null hypotheses that there is no 226 
interaction between contract type and other project characteristics (i.e. project type, owner type, 227 
project size, procurement method, and sustainability levels) in regards to project cost performance 228 
was not rejected. In other words, it is reasonable to believe that the difference in time and cost 229 
performance between lump sum and GMP contract is the same within different project characteristics. 230 
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Please insert Table <8> here 231 
Figure 7 summarizes the statistical relationships between project characteristics (i.e. project type, 232 
owner type, procurement method, project size, and sustainability requirement level) and selection of 233 
contract types (i.e. lump sum and GMP), and the impact of contract types on the time and cost 234 
performance of DB projects.  235 
Please insert Fig <7> here  236 
 237 
Discussion  238 
Of the project characteristics, project type, owner type, and procurement method have statistically 239 
significant influence on the contract types, while project size and sustainability levels (in terms of 240 
different LEEDs certifications) seem to have no significant impact on the contract types.  241 
For the project type, civil infrastructure projects largely use lump sum contract.  This is due to their 242 
unique characteristics. For example, civil infrastructure projects are normally large and have long 243 
project life, with high level risks relating to technology, finance, environment and community 244 
(Loosemore 2007). In order to reduce project risks, when delivering civil infrastructure projects 245 
owners normally employ engineering consultants to clearly define the technical and functional 246 
performance specifications and provide more detailed design and engineering information before DB 247 
contractor selection (Xia et al., 2013). Thus Lump sum is more appropriate when the project is clearly 248 
defined. For industrial processing projects, given the significant importance of engineering/design 249 
innovation to the project success along with the specialization of DB contractors in this field, GMP 250 
contract will facilitate the DB contractors’ innovative input and project control.  251 
According to Molenaar et al. (1999), design/build often uses negotiated GMP in private sector while 252 
public-sector policy generally requires a lump sum contract with a competitive award. The results of 253 
this research show that public owners still prefer lump sum contract for DB projects even though 254 
GMP contract is legally permitted in government sectors. According to Federal Acquisition 255 
Regulation (FAR), a cost-reimbursement(with or without GMP) contract may be used only when (1) 256 
the contractor’s accounting system is adequate for determining costs applicable to the contract, and(2) 257 
appropriate Government surveillance during performance will provide reasonable assurance that 258 
efficient methods and effective cost controls are used (Federal, 2005). Given that public owners are 259 
normally risk aversion and do not have enough resources for performance surveillance, GMP contract 260 
is less attractive compared with lump sum, which places upon the contractor maximum risk and full 261 
responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss.  262 
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For procurement method, when DB contractor is selected on low bid basis, owners typically provide 263 
more design information (usually 15%–50%) to increase price competition (Xia et al., 2012a). Thus 264 
lump sum is normally used for low bid method to obtain cost reduction and security. When the 265 
procurement methods moved from low bid to sole source selection, less design proportion is provided 266 
in request for proposals and DB contractors enter into contract arrangement earlier in project stages. 267 
Because of that, GMP is more likely to be used as it is difficult to obtain a fixed-price type of contract 268 
at the outset.  269 
The analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) reveals that DB projects with GMP contracts have 270 
statistically significant better cost performance than those with lump sum contract. This may be due to 271 
the fact that GMP contract normally provide incentives causes for DB contractors to share the cost 272 
savings (Kaplanogu and Arditi, 2009; Bogus et al., 2010). This finding confirms Bogus et al.’s (2010) 273 
finding that GMP contracts result in better cost performance than lump sum contract. The two-way 274 
ANOVA tests indicate that the effect of contract types on time and cost performance seems to be 275 
similar within different project characteristics. 276 
 277 
Conclusions  278 
The design-build delivery system has been widely used in the U.S. non-residential construction 279 
industry with lump sum and GMP as the major contract payment provisions. However, there was a 280 
lack of empirical studies to compare the project performance within different contract types and to 281 
investigate how different project characteristic affect the owners’ selection of contract arrangement. 282 
Project information from DBIA database was collected to reveal the statistical relationship between 283 
different project characteristics and contract types and compare project performance within lump sum 284 
and GMP contract. 285 
The results show that lump sum is still the most frequently used contract method for DB projects. The 286 
chi-square tests of cross tabulations reveal that project type, owner type, and procurement method 287 
affect the usage of contract types significantly. Public owners are still in favour of lump sum contract 288 
while private sector owners prefer GMP. Civil infrastructure rather than industrial engineering project 289 
tends to use lump sum more frequently. Qualification-oriented contractor selection process resorts to 290 
GMP more often compared with cost-oriented process. When comparing project performance 291 
between lump sum and GMP, the cost performance (in terms of cost overrun) with GMP contract is 292 
significantly better compared with projects with lump sum. Additionally, different project 293 
characteristics appear to have no interaction effect on contract types relating to project performance. 294 
However, it should be pointed out that the findings of this research should be treated with cautions. 295 
The statistical correlation (significant or not) between project characteristics and contract types does 296 
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not infer a causal relationship between the two variables involved. Additionally, given that the DBIA 297 
database does not contain the information of other project characteristics (e.g. design proportion 298 
provided by owners, importance weight of contractor selection criteria, etc.), the findings of this 299 
research may only reveal tip of the iceberg.  300 
The contributions of this research to the current body of knowledge are twofold. First, it provides 301 
solid empirical evidence (using a large sample with real project performance data) relating to project 302 
performance within different contract types (i.e. lump sum and GMP). Second, project characteristics 303 
that significantly affect adoption of different contract methods have been identified. The findings 304 
provide a number of implications for project owners. First, GMP contract should be considered when 305 
competition on budget is critical given that that projects using GMP have significant better cost 306 
performance than those with lump sum contract. Additionally, GMP is recommended when the 307 
contractor selection move from cost oriented to best value or qualification based approach.  308 
Despite some significant findings of this research, this research suffers from a number of limitations. 309 
First, the sample sizes of projects with some characteristics (e.g. projects of low bid, and sole source 310 
selection, projects with different LEED levels etc.) are quite small, which prevent the statistical 311 
verification of conclusions. Second, as this research only considered the project characteristics 312 
available in the database, other project information which may affect the selection of contract methods 313 
remains unknown. Therefore, a further investigation of the underlying reasons for owners’ selection 314 
of contract types will both help validate the findings of this study and help improve current DB 315 
delivery practices. 316 
 317 
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Table 1 Relationship between contract methods and project types 370 
Project type 
Contract methods  Total project 
number Lump Sum GMP Cost plus fee 
Civil infrastructure 71 25 6 102 
69.6% 24.5% 5.9% 100.0% 
Commercial/institutional 126 84 8 218 
57.8% 38.5% 3.7% 100.0% 
Industrial processing 14 17 5 36 
38.9% 47.2% 13.9% 100.0% 
Total project number  211 126 19 356 
59.3% 35.4% 5.3% 100.0% 
Note: 2 = 16.011 (p=.003, d.f.=4) 371 
  372 
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Table 2.Relationship between contract methods and owner types 373 
Project type 
Contract methods  Total project 
number Lump Sum GMP Cost plus fee 
Government 
160 56 4 220 
72.7% 25.5% 1.8% 100.0% 
Not for profit organization 
8 12 0 20 
40.0% 60.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Private company 
28 46 12 86 
32.6% 53.5% 14.0% 100.0% 
Total project number 196 114 16 326 
60.1% 35.0% 4.9% 100.0% 
Note: 2 = 55.340 (p=.000, d.f.=4, 2 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5) 374 
  375 
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Table 3 Relationship between contract types and procurement methods 376 
Procurement type Contract methods  Total project number Lump Sum GMP Cost plus fee 
Low bid 
3 0 1 4 
75.0% 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Best value 
162 64 8 234 
69.2% 27.4% 3.4% 100.0% 
Qualification based  
31 51 4 86 
36.0% 59.3% 4.7% 100.0% 
Sole source 5 9 4 18 
27.8% 50.0% 22.2% 100.0% 
Total project number 201 124 17 342 
58.8% 36.3% 5.0% 100.0% 
Note: 2 = 50.295 (p=.000, d.f.=6,41.7% cells have expected count less than 5) 377 
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Table 4 Relationship between contract types and project sizes 379 
Project size 
Contract methods  Total project 
number Lump Sum GMP Cost plus fee 
Small 
99 67 12 178 
55.6% 37.6% 6.7% 100.0% 
Large 
99 54 5 158 
62.7% 34.2% 3.2% 100.0% 
Total project number 198 121 17 336 
58.9% 36.0% 5.1% 100.0% 
Note: 2 = 3.100 (p=.212, d.f.=2) 380 
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Table 5 Relationship between contract types and sustainability requirements  382 
Sustainability levels Contract methods  Total project number Lump Sum GMP 
Non LEED 
130 82 212 
61.3% 38.7% 100.0% 
LEED Certified  
6 7 13 
46.2% 53.8% 100.0% 
LEED Silver  28 18 46 
60.9% 39.1% 100.0% 
LEED Gold 35 17 52 
67.3% 32.7% 100.0% 
LEED Platinum 12 3 15 
80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Total project number 211 127 338 
62.4% 37.6% 100.0% 
Note: 2 = 4.129 (p=.389, d.f.=4, 10.0% cell have expected count less than 5) 383 
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Table 6 Time overrun performance between contract types 385 
Contract type No. Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum P Value P value 
lump sum 186 0.23% .19849 -.52 1.13 .270 
.132 GMP 115 -.2.15%  (Time saving) .14949 -.42 .71 
cost plus fee 18 8.11% .45102 -.32 1.69  
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Table 7 Cost overrun performance between contract types 388 
Contract type No. Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum P value P value 
lump sum 199 8.70% .24065 -.22 2.86 
.023* 
.009** GMP 118 3.07% .15010 -.38 1.00 
cost plus fee 17 20.06% .49759 -.07 1.75  
 389 
  390 
20 
 
Table 8 tests of between-subjects effects 391 
Source 
Significance level (cost overrun as 
dependent variable) 
Significance level (time overrun as 
dependent variable) 
Contract type*Project type .885 .259 
Contract type*Owner type .551 .528 
Contract type*Project size .804 .975 
Contract type*procurement methods  .855 .326 
Contract type*Sustainability levels .804 .747 
 392 
